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Cross sectional time series data in a partial adjustment model examine local 
government behavior under an aggregate property tax levy limit and under Truth in 
Taxation in Kansas.  Results indicate that the aggregate levy limit would have continued 
to restrict property tax revenue and spending had it not been replaced. 
 
Introduction 
This paper examines the state-level tax limitations placed on property tax revenue 
in Kansas.  Over the past 35 years, the Kansas legislature has had some form property tax 
limitation in place.  From 1989, the Kansas property tax limitation tied the amount of 
property tax revenue that could be generated to the 1989 assessed property value and 
value of new improvements to property.  This control essentially limited the revenue 
collected to the same amount as the base year.  However, local officials complained that 
this did not allow enough financial flexibility to meet the needs that occur at the county 
level.  In 1999, Truth in Taxation replaced the aggregate tax levy limit.  Truth in Taxation 
allowed local officials to increase the levy by any amount they deemed necessary, but 
officials first had to publicly announce their intentions through a resolution or an 
ordinance.  This stipulation was supposed to act as a control mechanism for local 
government, in that it would allow taxpayers a chance to express their opposition. 
The objective of this study is to examine patterns of county government public 
finances under the alternative “hard” tax lid, wherein a specific formula dictated the 
amounts of property tax that could be raised, versus the “soft” tax lid that provided local 
officials with greater discretion regarding raising tax revenues.  A unique aspect of this 
research was the use of a tax levy factor to represent cumulative effects of the aggregate 
levy limit.  The factor indexed property tax revenue generation to 1989, the first year 
under the law.  County officials used this factor during the earlier law to calculate the allowable growth of county government property tax revenue.  This study projects this 
factor through 2004 to estimate tax lid effects had the law remained in place and then 
compares these estimates to actual revenues and effects under the Truth in Taxation law. 
Literature Review 
 
During World War II, state and local taxes generally held constant or decreased.  
After the war ended, many local governments expanded programs, which required more 
tax money.  While local governments increased property tax rates to provide for 
expanded government programs, they also benefited from increased revenue due to 
increasing property values.  During this time, increasing numbers of citizens started to 
feel over-taxed.  Newspapers began to carry stories about the topic, including stories of 
some homeowners forced to sell their homes because of the tax burden (Fisher). 
  By the 1970s, property tax protests were sweeping the country, personified for 
many by California’s 1978 Proposition 13.  Local government tax limitation measures 
began as early as the 1800s, but most were implemented in the early 1970s.  Nearly all 
local governments, and more than half of the states in the United States, were constrained 
in their budgeting by a statutory or constitutional limit on taxes, spending, or both.  The 
statutory or constitutional limits came in several different forms.  The limits at the local 
level were directed at tax rates, tax revenue, amount of expenditures, or the growth rate of 
revenue or expenditures. 
As of 1992, 27 states had some sort of state government tax or expenditure limit.  
Seventeen states restricted the annual growth in own-source revenue or expenditures to 
the percentage growth rate of state personal income (Fisher).  Six states restricted the 
annual growth in own-source revenue or expenditure to a fixed percentage limit.  Four states restricted the annual growth in own-source revenue or expenditure to the 
percentage growth in population and the general price level.  The limitations of the 27 
states were either instigated by taxpayers using the initiative and referendum process or, 
in most cases, proposed by the state’s legislature.  In the end, approximately half of the 
limitations were passed by a public vote and the other half passed by vote of the 
legislature (Fisher).   
Early studies of state level tax limitation policies had a limited number of years 
under a tax limitation to analyze.  Often the early research produced results that showed 
tax limitations had very little or no effect on the growth of taxes or government spending.  
As of 2004, 43 states had passed some form of tax and expenditure limit either at the state 
or local level (Glickman and Painter).  Now that more time has passed, studies using 
fifteen to twenty years of data in which a tax limitation was in effect indicate that taxation 
limits have different effects on such things as growth of taxes and government spending. 
  Local government tax expenditure limitations come in many different forms: 
overall property tax rates, specific property tax rates, property tax levies, general revenue 
or expenditure increases, assessment increases, and full disclosure.  Previous studies have 
not established the effectiveness of tax limitations (Skidmore).  Table 1 lists selected 
studies by type of limitation and by the target of the limitation, while Table 2 shows 
selected studies, the estimation technique and the types of variables used in each study. 
  Tax and expenditures limitations affect nearly all United States voters and policy 
makers at either the state or local level or both.  Government revenue and expenditures 
may have been affected by the tax and expenditure limitations that were put in place.  By knowing the effects, voters and policymakers can be informed and determine whether the 
policy achieved the desired outcome. 
Conceptual Model 
This research focuses on two types of limitations.  First, the 1989 Kansas property 
tax levy limitation, which limited the annual growth of revenues, in effect until 1998.  
Secondly, Truth in Taxation, which took effect in Kansas in 1999.  This research 
compares the two types of limitations to determine how each affected county government 
revenues and expenditures during the period 1989 to 2004. 
It was hypothesized that as time passed under the levy limit, real property tax 
revenue per capita, real discretionary own-source revenue per capita, and real 
discretionary own-source expenditure per capita would have decreased.  In addition, as 
time passed, real assessed property value per capita would increase because aggressively 
reassessing real property might give local officials a way to minimize the effects of the 
aggregate tax levy limitation by pushing up valuations with a fixed mill rate. 
Data 
  Four dependent variables were chosen to observe the different ways the two 
limitation laws may have restricted the local governments in Kansas
1: real property tax 
revenue per capita, real tangible assessed valuation, real discretionary own-source 
expenditure per capita, and real discretionary own-source revenue per capita.  Real 
discretionary own-source expenditure per capita refers to the expenditures that are within 
local discretionary control and not dictated by state law or formula; such expenditures 
might decrease under tax restrictions.  Finally, changes in real discretionary own-source 
revenue per capita, the revenues subject to local discretionary control, may indicate 
                                                 
1 Brown also used different dependent variables with the same independent variables. whether tax limitations are offset by greater use of alternative revenue sources not 
restricted by the tax limitation, such as sales taxes. 
The effects of the alternative tax limitation restrictions are observed in the actual 
and projected trends of the dependent variables for the full term of the study (1991-2004).  
The dependent variables are conceived as a function of county characteristics reflected by 
the performance of the economy, demographic attributes, county structure, time effects, 
and aggregate levy limit.  Data for dependent variables come from the Kansas Fiscal 
Database, while explanatory data come from Woods and Poole, Inc.  Rural-urban 
continuum codes come from the USDA Economic Research Service.  Table 3 lists the 
specific explanatory variables by category.  The aggregate levy limit reflects the amount 
that each individual county could levy annually in accordance with the tax law.  A two-
year lagged dependent variable was chosen to control for autocorrelation.  Finally, a year 
trend variable was constructed to measure the effects across time.  As in previous studies, 
the trend implemented was linear; however, unlike previous studies, the actual number of 
the year was used rather than a counter (1, 2, 3, 4, etc.). 
The Aggregate Levy Limit 
Each year, count governments calculated a tax levy factor each year to determine 
the amount that the property tax levy could increase under the tax lid (equation 1).  The 
factor plus one was multiplied by the 1989 real base year tax levy in 2000 dollars to 
determine the new tax levy for the next year.  The factor was the most that a county could 
raise their property tax levy above the base year, according to the aggregate levy 
limitation. 
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Where 
F         tax levy factor for a Kansas county 
NI       new improvements to property for a Kansas county 
Β PP      value of personal property in current year for a Kansas county 
Α PP     value of personal property in 1989 base year for a Kansas county 




  This research used an out of sample partial adjusted model with ordinary least 
squares to estimate each of the four dependent variables in two separate regressions 
(equation 2).  The first regression period was from 1991 to 1998 to explain the effects of 
an aggregate levy limit, and the second period from 1999 to 2004 explained the truth in 
taxation effects. 
(2)  i i i u X y + + = 1 0 β β  
where 
i y             described level of 
0 β            intercept 
1 β             short-run multiplier of  i x  
i u             was the error term 
 
  Whereas studies such as Skidmore and Skidmore and Blankenau used fixed or 
random effects models, Greene states that a random effects model would fit if only a 
sample of the population was used in the analysis.  This study included 97 of Kansas’ 105 
counties – the exclusions either because of missing data or consolidated county-city 
government structure.  The advantage of having an out of sample partial adjusted model 
was that the parameters were intrinsically linear and the disturbance was non-
autocorrelated.  In addition, the out of sample part of the model created the opportunity to determine what the patterns of property tax revenue, own source expenditure, own source 
revenue, and the assessed value of property would have been if either tax limitation 
policy had been in effect for the full study.   
(3)        t t t t y x y ' 1
' ' ε λ β α + + + = −  
where 
t y        described level of 
' α        intercept 
' β        short-run multiplier of  t x  
' δ        short-run multiplier of  t w  
λ         parameter estimate of the lagged dependent variable ( 1 − t y )  
t ' ε        was the error term 
 
In this study, the out of sample part of the model (equation 3) was carried out by 
multiplying the mean values of the first period, 1991 to 1998, times the second period, 
1999 to 2004, coefficients to determine what the pattern of revenue, expenditure, and 
assessed value would have been if the Truth in Taxation limitation had been in effect 
from 1989-1999 (backcasting).  The reverse was done by multiplying the mean values of 
the second period by the coefficients from the first period to determine what the pattern 
of revenue, expenditure, and assessed value would have been if the aggregate levy 
limitation not been repealed.  The predicted values were estimated using equation 4. 
(4)         β * M P =  
Where 
P        out of sample prediction 
M       mean values 
β        coefficients 
 Results and Conclusions 
 
  Results of the partial adjustment regressions can be seen in Figures 1-4.  
Coefficients and t-statistics are available from the authors upon request.  Figure 1 
compares the predicted values of property tax revenues if the aggregate tax limit had 
continued beyond 1998 to the actual property tax revenues generated under Truth in 
Taxation.  The figure shows that property tax revenues would have been lower under the 
aggregate levy limit.  It seems that the aggregate tax limit did have some restrictive effect 
on property tax revenues.  Figure 2 compares predicted and actual own-source 
discretionary revenues during the study period.  Predicted values under the levy limit also 
forecast at below the actual revenues taken during Truth in Taxation.  Figure 3 indicates 
that own-source expenditures also would have declined had the aggregate levy limit 
continued.  Finally, Figure 4 shows the effects of each property tax regime on real 
tangible assessed valuation.  Real tangible assessed valuation trended downward through 
1998, indicating that county officials did not use assessed valuation as a means to 
circumvent the limitations on property tax rates. 
It appears that the property tax levy limit in Kansas did have some effect on 
revenue generation and expenditures.  Once the levy limit was replaced, local officials 
did have more flexibility regarding revenue generation and used that flexibility. 
Future Research 
  This research provides a foundation upon which future research can build.  It 
would be advantageous in future efforts to try to account for some of the external 
influences specified above.  That is, include variables that capture the effects of changes 
in demand transfers, the recessionary period in 2001, and several more years’ data.  In addition, it would be informative to apply the model to other states with similar local 
government levy limitation policies to compare patterns of local government finances.  
Comparing such results would provide additional information about the effectiveness of 
local government tax and expenditure limitation initiatives.  Of particular interest might 
be the use of an out of sample partial adjustment model in a state before and after a 
limitation was enacted to identify the differences in the patterns of local government 
revenues and expenditures. 
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 Table 2. Tax and Expenditure Limitation (TEL) Initiatives-Selected Studies 
 



















Real own-source education 
spending per school age population 
by school districts within a state;  
real state aid to school districts per 
school age population; real total 
state education spending per school 
age population 
 
Per capita income; per capita own-source school district spending; per student federal aid to state government; population 
density; proportion of population over age 65; proportion of population that is nonwhite; deductibility of state and local 














Percent change in house prices; 
percent change in school/ non-
school spending; percent change in 
number of students; percent change 
in population; single family permits 
per housing unit 
Property tax rate; dummies for years of levy reductions and overrides; education law reform spending change; property 
value per capita; nonresidential share of property value; increase in state aid; school test scores; fraction of workforce in 
manufacturing; fraction of population between 35 and 60 years; fraction of population less than 5 years; dummies 
indicating urban or suburban; developable land per housing unit; single family permits per housing unit in 1989;  
enrollment-to-population ratio; median family income; dummy variables for members of regional district/regional high 










Each individual revenue and 
expenditure category 
Overall trend variable; an intervention variable for each TEL; dichotomous variable for each group municipalities; annual 
average unemployment rate; construction earnings; manufacturing earnings; real per capita retail sales; farm income; 



























Municipal property tax growth 
rates; school district property tax 
growth rates; school district 
operating expenditure growth rates; 
school district instructional 
expenditure growth rates 
 
Residential share of equalized assessed value; home-rule municipalities; growth in number of pupils; yearly dummy 
variables for 1989 to 1999; window year (the year following the vote to impose tax caps); capped years 1-9; capped years 
1-3; capped years 4-9; dummy school years from 1988-89 to 2000-01; residential share of equalized assessed value; 
home-rule municipalities; dummy variables for 1998 and 1999; dummy school years for 1999-2000 and 2000-2001; 1990 
population; per capita income 1989; average daily attendance; change in natural log of average daily attendance; low-









Total tax revenues  Dummy for states with expenditure limits; dummy for states with revenue limits; state personal income; federal transfers 
to state governments; state population; indexed annualized average interest rate on state and local bonds; average 
unemployment rate for non-agricultural workers; average of the producer price index for fuel; interaction variable for the 












median voter  
model 
 
Dummy variable equal to one in 




State level; specific property tax rate; overall property tax; property tax rate; assessment increase; general 
revenue/expenditure; full disclosure; unemployment rate; income per capita; distribution of income; long-term debt per 
capita; deficit dummy; lagged deficit dummy; revenue centralization; tax capacity; line-item veto dummy; split-party 
government dummy; referendum process dummy; election year dummy; balanced-budget rule dummy; democratic 
governor dummy; percent of lower house democrat; percent of population bureaucrats; percent of population prisoners; 
neighboring state has lottery dummy; percent black; percent greater than or equal to 65 years of age; percent five to 
seventeen years of age; percent catholic; population; population density 
 
 Table 2. Tax and Expenditure Limitation (TEL) Initiatives-Selected Studies 
 




























Ratio of total state revenue to state 
personal income; ratio of total state 
and local revenue to state personal 
income; ratio of state revenue to 
total state/local revenue; ratio of 
state tax revenue to total state 
revenue; ratio of state debt to total 
state income  
Trend variable counting each year the study; a counter for each year after adoption of a TEL; annual state/local per capita 
federal aid; annual unemployment rate; proportion of the workforce in manufacturing; annual change in income; the 
















Percent change in equalized value 
per capita of property 
 
Six community type dummies; six dummies for the timing of the assessments; constrained in 1982 exogenous; 
constrained in 1983 exogenous; true tax rate in 1981 exogenous; true tax rate in 1981 squared exogenous; open space 
ratio in 1984 exogenous; constrained in 1982 endogenous; constrained in 1983 endogenous; median year housing built; 
percent high school graduates; percent college graduates; percent executive and professionals; percent white collar; 
median family income; per capita income; aid; levy; receipts; true tax rate in 1981; true tax rate in 1981 squared; open 










1997, Data is 












Local government fiscal structure 
within individual county areas 
 
 
Local tax limit; expenditure limits; both local tax and expenditure limits; urban core; relative stress; overall property tax 
rate limits or limitations on assessments; specific property tax rate limits directed at general purpose governments; 
specific property tax rate limits directed at school districts; specific property tax rate limits directed at constraining 
revenue yield or aggregate expenditure levels; levy limits; revenue limit; or expenditure limit applied to general purpose 














Measure of public sector size; six 
measures of revenue source 
reliance; five measures of state 
revenue shares; five measures of 
state expenditure share 
Binary variable for each TEL type; dichotomous variable to indicate the presence of a TEL in each state; binary variable 
for states with combination of state/local TELs; binary variable for two types of local TELs; a counter variable of years 
since enactment for state TELs and local TELs; per capita personal income; lagged change in gross state product; ratio of 
expenditure to GSP; population 25 years or younger; population 65 years or older; change in population 25 years or less; 
















only institution; head-or-land-tax 
institution; mixed institution  
 
Generation one; generation two; size of generation; period one; period 2;  private numeraire good; land; intergeneration 
public good 
 
 Table 2. Tax and Expenditure Limitation (TEL) Initiatives-Selected Studies 
 














Total state government own source 
revenues; total state revenue; total 
state revenue; charges and 
miscellaneous revenues; local 
government own source revenues; 
state aid to local governments; 
property tax; local other taxes; 




Federal government transfers to state and local governments; state personal income; state population; dummy variable to 
indicate a TEL; dummy variables to indicate type of limit (overall limit; property tax; new limit introduced); population 
















share of voters who favored 
proposition 2 ½,;  household 
movement;  property value 
 
A measure of jurisdictions forced reduction in tax rates mandated by proposition 2 ½, average “measure” reduction in tax 
rates mandated by proposition 2 ½ in 20-mile radius; percent of households in 1980 that were renters; 1980 employment 
to population ratio; county fixed effects to control for regional variation; 1980’s share of Presidential votes for Ronald 
Regan; share with grater than high school education; nonwhite share; median income; share in poverty; share of 
households with children ages 6-17 only; share of households with children under age 6; share of households with head 
over age 65; initial tax rate; a measure of jurisdictions forced reduction in tax rates mandated by proposition 2 ½; 
predicted change in share (aging of population by 10 years); 1980 population; land area; Connecticut towns as a control; 
share of population favoring Proposition 2 ½; share favoring Proposition 2 1/2 multiplied by tax rate mandate by 
















Tenure length  Family total income; income from welfare; African-American dummy; Hispanic dummy; Asian dummy; other races 
dummy; white dummy (dropped); high school dummy; some college dummy; bachelor dummy; post graduate dummy; 
high school dropout dummy (dropped); married; separated; divorced; widowed; children under equal to age six; number 
of children; age 26-35 dummy (dropped); age 36-45 dummy; age 46-55 dummy; age 56-65 dummy; age 66 and up 
dummy; native born dummy (dropped); migrant from out-of-state dummy; migrant dummy; multi-family housing unit 
dummy (dropped); single family detached dummy; single family attached dummy; not in labor force dummy (dropped); 
at work and self-employed dummy; at work and not self-employed dummy; unemployed dummy; retired dummy; 1970 
dummy (dropped); 1980 dummy; 1990 dummy; 2000 dummy; 1980*CA; 1990*CA; 2000*CA; metro pop growth rate 
previous 10 years; metro unemployment rate; metro housing value growth rate previous 10 years  
Table 3. Explanatory Variables 
Economic       Demographic 
P e r f o r m a n c e        A t t r i b u t e s  
 
unemployment  rate      proportion  of  population  age  0-17 
real total retail sales per capita      proportion of population age 65+ 
real total personal income per capita 
real manufacturing earnings per capita 
real service earnings per capita 
real farm earnings per capita 
 
County Structure 
2003 rural-urban continuum code 
farm employment as a share of total employment 
manufacturing employment as a share of total employment 

































Aggregate Truth Linear (Truth) Linear (Aggregate)
 










































Aggregate Truth Linear (Truth) Linear (Aggregate)
 
















































Aggregate Truth Linear (Truth) Linear (Aggregate)
 









































Aggregate Truth Linear (Truth) Linear (Aggregate)
 
Figure 4. Real Tangible Assessed Value Under Different Kansas Tax Policies From 
1991-2003 
 